Childless Mothers?—The New Catch-22: You Can\u27t Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too by Wood, Cheri L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-1995
Childless Mothers?—The New Catch-22: You
Can't Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too
Cheri L. Wood
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cheri L. Wood, Childless Mothers?—The New Catch-22: You Can't Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 383
(1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol29/iss1/12
CHILDLESS MOTHERS?-THE NEW CATCH-22:
YOU CAN'T HAVE YOUR KIDS AND
WORK FOR THEM TOO
Solomon's wisdom, after all, lay in the fact that he did not
divide the child.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Are mothers being forced to choose between keeping a good job
and living with their children? What happens when Mom forgoes the
job? Who pays for food, clothing, medical care, education, and other
ever-increasing expenses? Does child support, if ordered and col-
lected,2 cover such expenses?3  If Mom works outside the home,
does this make her a less-than-suitable person to continue raising her
children when Dad can provide an in-home mother substitute?
1. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits of Law: On
Dividing the Child, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1808, 1838 (1994).
2. "Three-quarters of custodial mothers in this country either lack child support
orders or fail to receive full payments under such orders." Margaret Campbell Haynes,
Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for Reform, 27 FAM. L.Q. 7, 7 (1993) (citing
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-60, No. 173, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989 (1991)).
The more than $14 billion in past-due child support that was owed in 1987
rose to more than $23 billion in 1990-even after collection of more than $4
billion per year.
Today, more than 12 million child support enforcement cases are pending
in the United States. The trend is for the caseload to increase by about 1 million
cases per year despite the collection efforts of tens of thousands of dedicated
people employed by government agencies throughout the nation.
Charles Drake & Jan L. Warner, Child Support Collection-What's a Client to Do?, FAM.
ADVOC., 1993, at 38,38. Moreover, when child support is ordered, the awards vary across
racial lines-to the detriment of minority women. Women in Poverty, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 925,928 (1982) (revealing that child support is awarded to 71% of Caucasian women,
44% of Hispanic women, and 29% of African American women).
3. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECrED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323
(1985) ("When income is compared to needs divorced men experience an average 42
percent rise in their standard of living in the first year after the divorce, while divorced
women (and their children) experience a 73 percent decline."); infra note 126.
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In an era when over fifty percent of all mothers4 and almost
eighty percent of divorced mothers' are working outside the home,
media accounts of women losing custody of their children because of
their working-mother status abound.6  Working mothers7 appear to
be in a lose-lose situation. "Either you're a bad mother because you
work and are away from your children, or you're a bad mother
because you haven't taken sufficient financial responsibility for
yourself and your family."' According to Roberta Cooper Ramo,
president-elect of the American Bar Association, "'It's a crazy double
4. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531,540, 724 P.2d 486,492, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806
(1986) (citing Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 15 (1984)); Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Mother's Status
as "Working Mother" as Factor in Awarding Child Custody, 62 A.L.R.4TH 259,264 (1994).
5. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806 (citing Susan
Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial
and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 739, 740 (1983)); Raymond, supra
note 4, at 264-65. It has been reported that the Department of Labor has determined that
23 million mothers are working. LynNell Hancock et al., Putting Working Mons in
Custody, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 54, 55.
6. Karen Nussbaum, Why Should Working Moms Lose Kids?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec.
26, 1994, at B19 ("Over the past several months a number of legal cases have gained
public attention, all involving mothers who lost custody because they took time away from
their children to work or study."). See, e.g., Bettina Boxall, Marcia Clark's Husband Cites
Trial in Custody Fight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at Al (revealing that lead prosecutor
Marcia Clark's ex-husband is seeking custody of their two children based upon her
increased work load in Simpson trial); Susan Chira, Working Mom in D.C. Loses Custody
Fight to Ex-Husband, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1994, at A4 (discussing court order
compelling Sharon Prost, counsel to Senator Orrin Hatch, to surrender custody of her two
sons to her former husband because she was "more devoted to and absorbed by her work
and her career than ... her children"); Hancock et al., supra note 5, at 54; Carol Kleiman,
Judge Should Check in with Reality, Not Rail on Career Mons, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1994,
(Business), at 3 (reporting on Michigan case in which judge removed daughter from
custody of mother who won college scholarship and relied on campus day care, and placed
child with father because father's mother would babysit); Cameron Stauth, Why a Good
Mother Lost Custody of Her Child, McCALL'S, Oct. 1992, at 115, 115 (relating true story
of Eileen Adams's battle for custody of her son for which NBC movie, Because Mommy
Works, was inspired); Oprah. The Oprah Winfrey Show: Marcia Clark on Trial as a
Mother, at 1 (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 31, 1995) (transcript on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Oprah Transcript] ("[H]e filed for temporary
custody of the children, claiming they were starved for attention because Marcia Clark is
never home and never has any time to spend with them."); infra part II.
7. This Author, a single mother of two children, appreciates and wishes to
acknowledge that all mothers are working mothers. This is true regardless of whether they
work inside the home, outside the home, or, as in the majority of cases, both. For
clarification and efficiency in this Comment, however, when the term "working mother"
is used, it is meant to refer to mothers who, in addition to their child-care responsibilities,
also work outside the home.
8. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at B19.
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standard .... The... bizarre thing is that while we're telling welfare
mothers to work, we're also telling professional women not to. I
haven't figured this out."' 9
Should a mother's working status determine whether she should
remain the primary caretaking or custodial parent after (1) a custody
proceeding in conjunction with dissolution, (2) any initial proceeding
where custody had occurred by default, or (3) a modification pro-
ceeding brought by the noncustodial parent? And, should a father's
ability to provide an in-home mother substitute ever factor into such
a child-custody decision?
This Comment addresses the phenomenon of women who are
denied or lose custody of their children because they work outside the
home. It necessarily analyzes conditions in the current climate in
which custody decisions are made in order to reveal how those
conditions produce results detrimental to a child in the context of
determining whether a working woman should become or remain the
primary custodial parent. The subjectivity inherent in the current
"changed circumstances" rule and the "best interests of the child"
standard, used in these custody decisions, lends itself to uncertainty,
instability, and increased litigation particularly when one parent has
been the primary caretaker for a significant period of time. This
Comment illustrates how that very subjectivity becomes a useful tool
when the primary custodial parent or caretaker's-usually the
mother's °--newly acquired, continued, or expanded working sta-
tus-and ironically, sometimes her lack thereof-is wielded in any
custody battle.
This Comment begins with contemporary examples of mothers
whose working status determined whether they would continue as the
9. Hancock et al., supra note 5, at 55 (quoting Roberta Cooper Ramo, president-elect
of the American Bar Association); see also Oprah Transcript, supra note 6, at 21 ("Newt
Gingrich says if they don't work, they lose their kids. Now the judges are saying, 'If you
do work, you do lose your kids."' (quoting Lynne Gold-Bikin, Chair of the Family Law
Section, American Bar Association)).
10. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used
in Child Custody Determinations, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 (1992) (indicating
that statistic of 90% of all children of divorce are in custody of their mothers is "frequently
cited"); see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 78 (1992) (stating that in California study
of 1124 couples, fathers had custody in only 9.5% of cases); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, NO. 458,
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACrERISTICS: MARCH 1991, at 9 (1992) (finding that
only 14% of children living in single-parent homes lived with their father).
November 1995]
386 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:383
primary caretaker or custodial parent of their children." To lay the
groundwork for exploring how this phenomenon operates under
current custody laws, this Comment examines the history of how
child-custody determinations have been made in this country. 2
Thereafter, the use of the current best interests standard and changed
circumstances rule in custody decisions is analyzed-with a focus on
how they have negatively affected working women.13 This Comment
recommends that when two otherwise fit parents cannot reach or
maintain an agreement concerning the custody disposition of their
children, a presumption favoring-as much as possible-previously
established patterns of care should be applied. This Comment
explains how such a presumption would afford parties greater
predictability, alleviate the problems inherent in the current specula-
tive and indeterminate nature of custody decisions, offer stability and
resolution, and inspire both parents to take as active a role as possible
in their child's care. Such a presumption would be comparable, for
the most part, to the primary-caretaker presumption that has been
adopted in some jurisdictions. 4 The Author argues that a presump-
tion in favor of previously established patterns of care, reinforced by
the requirements set forth by the California Supreme Court, 5 should
11. See infra part II.
12. See infra part III.
13. See infra part IV.
14. See, eag., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). "It is clear that under
Garska v. McCoy ... [t]he best interests of the children can best be served by preserving
their primary relationship with the parent who has provided their primary care." Polikoff,
supra note 10, at 183. Although the Garska court dealt with an initial custody proceeding,
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 358-59, the same issue arises in actions to modify the initial custody
order; see id. Custody proceedings also arise when a modification from the initial order
is sought. In either case the court must still consider whether to preserve the child's
relationship with the parent who had provided the primary nurturance and
care-regardless of whether that care was provided during an ongoing marriage, by
circumstance when no marriage or relationship existed between the parents, or after a
custody order had been issued. Thus, the primary-caretaker presumption can be applied
to a custody decision arising immediately upon dissolution, when there was no marriage
or cohabitation but one or both parties seek court-ordered custody after childcare
responsibility patterns have been established, or in a later modification proceeding. For
a detailed discussion of this principle, see infra part IV.A.
15. For a detailed discussion of this standard, see Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal, 3d 531,
724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986). Simply put, the court declared that (1) a child's
emotional bonds with the primary caretaking parent must be the first consideration, &L at
536, 724 P.2d at 489, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 803, (2) a parent may very well be the primary
caretaker while working, studying, using daycare and babysitting, and otherwise
"successfully coping with the many difficulties encountered by single working mothers,"
iU at 541, 724 P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 807, and (3) reasoning "that care by a mother
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be the majority rule. 6 Finally, this Comment concludes that such a
presumption would discourage litigation, promote fairer negotiations
and settlements, secure finality in decision making, and encourage co-
parenting throughout a child's life.'7
II. THE NEW "CATCH-22"
Jennifer Ireland thought that by attending college and studying
hard she was obeying the rule of society that young, unmarried
mothers should stay off welfare. 8 In order to attend college, Ireland
placed her daughter in day care for part of each day while she went
to class. 9 As a result, Jennifer Ireland lost custody of her three-
year-old child.O Ironically, Maranda's father, Steve Smith, did not
intend to care for his daughter; rather, he planned to have his mother
look after Maranda while he himself attended college.2' Judge
Raymond Cashen, a Michigan circuit court judge, awarded custody of
the child to her father, saying that he didn't want Maranda "'raised
... by strangers.' "" To top it off, it seems that Steve Smith had not
initially sought custody of the child?5 Rather, Smith asked for
custody after Ireland went to court seeking the previously ordered
twelve dollars per week of child support for Maranda-something
Maranda's father had never provided&2
In November 1994, NBC aired the television movie Because
Mommy Works.5 The film was inspired by the true story of Eileen
Adams, a working mother who lost custody of her son when her ex-
husband, who had married a stay-at-home wife, sued for custody in an
who, because of work and study, must entrust the child to daycare centers and babysitters,
is per se inferior to care by a father who also works, but can leave the child with a
stepmother at home is not a suitable basis for a custody order," id. at 540, 724 P.2d at 492,
229 Cal. Rptr. at 806 (emphasis added). Thus, the California Supreme Court in Burchard
used the best interests of the child standard, but considered stability and continuity in the
life of a child to be of paramount importance to other factors that are "insignificant
compared to the fact that [one parent] has been the primary caretaker." It at 541, 724
P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
16. See infra part V.
17. See infra part VI.
18. Kleiman, supra note 6, at 3.
19. ld.
20. Iet
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Judge Cashen).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Because Mommy Works (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 21, 1994).
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Oregon court.26 Adams was a schoolteacher. At the time of the
trial in 1991, her son, Keith, had spent the majority of time with her
following her divorce from Keith's father, Steve McCracken, in
1987.27
Before the trial, Eileen Adams's attorney, Michael Wells of
Eugene, Oregon, explained to her that a new phenomenon was
occurring in courts: Judges were taking custody from single working
mothers and awarding it to ex-husbands with new wives who did not
work.2 Eileen replied, "So being a mother's just a matter of milk
and cookies after school?" 29
Ever mindful of the toll it would take on Keith, but believing that
her relationship with her son entailed much more than being home
each afternoon, she decided to defend and undergo the emotional and
financial expense of the custody suit.3" At trial, witnesses called on
behalf of Adams "portrayed her as a superb mother who'd made
countless sacrifices to be with her son and give him opportunities
she'd lacked."'" In court Eileen testified, "Personally, I think I'm a
better mother when I work-more fulfilled, happier. And part of my
responsibility as a mother is to be a role model for Keith. And let's
not lose sight of one thing: Keith loves me. The way I am."32 In
giving custody of Keith to his father, the court relied heavily on a
psychologist's custody evaluation giving great weight to the fact that
Steve's new wife did not have a job and could be home with Keith
after school.33 Lost in the court's decision was the fact that Eileen
Adams worked at the school Keith would attend if she had custody,
which would have allowed them to increase their time together during
the commute 4 and spend their day at the same place.
After the birth of her second child, Eileen began a "job-share"
program whereby she shared her class with another teacher, allowing
each to work a part-time week. However, when the judge awarded
custody to Steve McCracken, he also ordered Eileen Adams to pay
26. Telephone Interview with Christine Berardo, Screenwriter, Because Mommy Works
(Mar. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Berardo Interview]; see Nussbaum, supra note 6, at B19.
27. Stauth, supra note 6, at 115-16.
28. Id. at 116.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 124.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 124-25.
34. Id. at 122.
35. See idt; Berardo Interview, supra note 26.
CHILDLESS MOTHERS?
child support in an amount based upon what she would have earned
had she been teaching full time.36 The judge's reasoning? Because
it was Eileen's choice to work part time, she should not thereby
benefit from a reduction in support when she could be working full
time.
37
Most recently, in the shadow of the headlines over the O.J.
Simpson trial in Los Angeles, Marcia Clark's custody case stirred
opinions and emotions.38  She was thrust into the media limelight
due to her role as the lead prosecutor in the notoriously complex
Simpson case. Marcia filed for divorce in June 1994, just days before
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman were murdered.39 Her
ex-husband "contend[ed] that her grueling workload [harmed] their
two young sons."'' University of Southern California law professor
Scott Altman, speculated: "'I don't see why a court would regard this
temporary period [of the Simpson trial] as a basis for a permanent
change in custody."' 4  However, this issue fired up a heated,
nationwide debate.42 For example, a caller to Bill Handel's KFI
36. Berardo Interview, supra note 26.
37. I&
Had Eileen Adams appealed the judgment of the trial court she might have met with
success. Consider Ms. Polikoffs discussion of In re Marriage of Handy, 605 P.2d 738 (Or.
1980):
[A]n Oregon trial court judge awarded custody of a six-year-old girl and a three-
year-old boy to their father, based upon his plan to remarry and the judge's high
opinion of the father's future wife. Because Oregon case law specifically
mandated consideration of who [had] provided primary care for the children, and
because the mother had performed that role, the appellate court reversed.
Polikoff, supra note 10, at 182 (footnote omitted). Eileen Adams has since agonized on
a daily basis over her decision not to appeal. Berardo Interview, supra note 26. However,
at the time of the trial court's judgment, Ms. Adams weighed her belief that Keith's best
interests would be served by his remaining in her custody versus the heavy toll that it
would take on him if she prolonged the custody fight. Id. She also considered the needed
continuity and stability Keith could begin to have if left in the care of his father and
stepmother. Id. Adams's actions couldn't parallel any closer the phenomenon demon-
strated in front of King Solomon-that the person who is truly most attached to the child
will be willing to accept an inferior bargain in accordance with the child's best interests.
See 1 Kings 3:16; Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
38. See, eg., Robin Abcarian, As Standards Go, This One's a Double, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 8,1995, at El; Bettina Boxall & Frank B. Williams, Marcia Clark's Custody Case Stirs
Opinions, Emotions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,1995, at A30; Hancock et al., supra note 5, at 54;
Judith Regan, An Open Letter to Mr. Clark, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 57, 57.
39. Hancock et al., supra note 5, at 55.
40. Boxall, supra note 6, at Al. Apparently Gordon Clark's bid for custody followed
on the heels of Marcia Clark's request for additional child support. Id. at A14.
41. Boxall, supra note 6, at A14 (quoting Professor Scott Altman).
42. See supra note 38.
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radio morning show said, "The general consensus is what's good for
the goose is good for the gander .... If things were reversed, the
judge would have taken like six seconds to turn the kids over to
her.
,43
These cases and the underlying issue of whether a-mother's
working status should be determinative of whether she remains the
primary caretaker or custodial parent raise numerous questions. To
begin with, historically, has a gender bias operated in favor of mothers
in custody decisions? And, is a gender bias operating against mothers
now?
III. REVELATIONS IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: THE
LESS-THAN-MATERNAL HISTORY
Despite popular belief to the contrary,' men have been award-
ed custody of children throughout most of modem time.45 "Prefer-
ence for the mother in awarding custody.., is actually an extremely
limited doctrine of historically short duration. 4 6  "The father was
the 'natural' guardian and overseer of the child's religious training,
education, and was the beneficiary of the child's labor and servic-
es."'47 Custody of the child served merely as a natural extension of
the man's exclusive right to control his property.4 8 In fact, under the
common law "[t]he father even had the power to appoint a guardian
43. Boxall & Williams, supra note 38, at A31.
44. See, ag., Richard A. Warshak, Father-Custody and Child Development: A Review
and Analysis of Psychological Research, 4 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 185, 185 (1986) ("The
tradition of awarding custody to mothers following divorce is so entrenched in our culture
that, until recently, a father was awarded custody only if the mother was proved
exceptionally unfit."); Lynn Smith, A Custody Battle Plan That Takes No Prisoners, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at E3 (reviewing Michael Brennan's self-published tactical manual
Custody for Fathers: A Practical Guide Through the Combat Zone of a Brutal Custody
Battle, which Smith says refers to mothers as "adversaries who hold all the cards in court
because they have spent years developing tricks such as crying on demand [and] using...
melodrama and innuendo" and, while acknowledging that "brutal custody fights can be
incredibly damaging to children," "argues that men can't wait for laws to change").
45. J. Ranier Twiford, Joint Custody: A Blind Leap of Faith?, 4 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
157, 158 (1986); see also Henry H. Foster & Doris Jones Freed, Life with Father: 1978, 11
FAM. L.Q. 321 (1978) (reviewing history of child custody trends).
46. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 176.
47. Twiford, supra note 45, at 158-59 (citing Foster & Freed, supra note 45, at 321-22).
48. See Jay Einhorn, Child Custody in Historical Perspective: A Study of Changing
Social Perceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in Anglo-American Law, 4 BEHAV. SCL
& L. 119, 120-23 (1986).
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other than the mother to have charge of the children in the event of
his death.
49
During the nineteenth century a father enjoyed the rebuttable
presumption of an absolute right to custody unless he was found
unfit.50 Even the tender years presumption, a short-lived doctrine of
American family law that presumed that young children were better
off in the custody of their mothers,51 was not the equivalent of a
maternal preference custody standard for children of all ages.52 State
statutes expressed a paternal preference when older children were
involved.53 Even when the tender years presumption was applied,
"[t]he father was frequently appointed the legal guardian while
physical custody of young children was awarded to the mother."'5
Late in the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution and
compulsory education devalued children from an economic stand-
point.5 During this time "awards to mothers became [slightly] more
common."56 However, by the 1900s only fourteen states had enacted
legislation deviating from the common-law paternal preference
rule. 7 Moreover, what was "[e]specially notable during this period
[was] the fact that the father was relieved of the duty to support
children in their mother's custody."5" In those situations the benefit
of the tender years presumption inured only to women who had
independent financial resources to draw upon, as employment
opportunities for women were limited at that time.59
The best interests of the child standard began to develop while
the tender years presumption was still in place.6° It had been noted
that the "preference for the mother of young children, when all things
49. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests
of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences,
20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1; 6 (1985); see also Einhorn, supra note 48, at 123 ("If the child's
father died, the mother was by no means the next logical guardian. Guardianship in
common law came from the father, from the court, from the king-not from the mother.").
50. Jerry Behnke, Comment, Pawns or People? Protecting the Best Interests of
Children in Interstate Custody Disputes, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 699, 701 (1994).
51. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
52. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 176.
53. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1971 & Supp. 1978)).
54. Twiford, supra note 45, at 159.
55. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 176.
56. Id.
57. IL
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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were equal, was a shorthand means of expressing what was in the
child's best interests."6' However, the contrasting notion that the
tender years presumption "obscured the real issue, the best interests
of the child '62 soon replaced that line of thought.
During the 1970s critics claimed that the maternal preference
"unfairly discriminated against men."'  Studies proliferated showing
the importance of the father-child relationship, and it was argued that
mothers "could not provide the benefits the traditional mother's role
had afforded the children... because the divorce forced the mother
to assume roles ... that formerly had been filled by the father."'
The fact that ninety percent of children went to the custody of their
mothers was cited as statistical evidence of discrimination and
"'sexual stereotyping.' "65 Considering it violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts no longer
applied the maternal custody preference for children of tender
years.66 Thus, "[i]n the 1970's, the maternal preference was rejected
by an overwhelming majority of states."6 Hence, "judges were to
determine custody based on the best interests of the individual child
without a preference for either parent."'
IV. THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES RULE AND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD STANDARD-FEEDING GROUND FOR
"OUTMODED NOTIONS [RESULTING] IN HARSH
JUDGMENTS WHICH UNFAIRLY PENALIZE WOMEN"
69
Who could argue with the concept that a court, or anyone, ought
to do what is in a child's best interests? In practice, however, all
kinds of questions are raised when someone other than a child's
parents must decide what is in that child's best interests.70 The right
61. Id. at 177 n.10 (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-
201 (1970)).
62. Cochran, supra note 49, at 11.
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Id. at 12 (quoting Foster & Freed, supra note 45, at 333).
66. Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of
Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 250 (1994) (citing cases that
"eliminated the use of gender as a formal criterion in determining custody decisions").
67. Cochran, supra note 49, at 13.
68. Id.
69. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531,542, 724 P.2d 486,493, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807
(1986) (Bird, CJ., concurring).
70. Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455,
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of parents to exercise almost complete autonomy in decisions
regarding their children is constitutionally recognized, hallowed
territory in this country.7' In the context of a custody battle, given
the parents' current inability to reach a decision jointly, a custody
arrangement modeled after the parents' past decisions as to who
would be responsible for primary childcare best preserves that
hallowed territory.72 However, when divorced or divorcing parents
no longer agree on what is best for their children, including with
whom the child should be living, it is a virtual stranger who then has
the power and the discretion to make those decisions-by attempting
to predict the future.
In theory the goal of furthering a child's best interests seems
laudable. In reality, however, basing any custody decision on an
indeterminate standard proves to have several weaknesses. These
weaknesses create uncertainty, instability, and protracted litigation.
In particular they have proven to operate against working mothers
and their children.
A. How the Existing Law Applies the Changed Circumstances Rule
and Best Interests of the Child Standard When Parents Dispute
Custody
When no custody order exists and a change in a previously
established arrangement is sought73 or when parties are newly
divorcing and there has been a preexisting pattern of childcare, courts
466 (1984) ("While the best interest standard embodies an admirable ideal, its application
may present substantial difficulties .... ").
71. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (ruling that parents have
fundamental interest in "the care, custody and management of their child"); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (deciding that Georgia statute allowing parents to voluntarily
commit their children to state mental hospitals was not unconstitutional); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating that parents have "the liberty... to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that law prohibiting teaching foreign languages to children
violated parents' rights "to control the education of their own").
72. See discussion infra part V.B.; see also Oprah Transcript supra note 6, at 19
(quoting Lynne Gold-Bikin, Chair of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association,
as commenting that parents' choices, not judges', should dictate what is best for their
children: "[T]o have some guy they've never seen before, who is trained in law school to
read the law ... sitting on the bench .... [They will] never see him again. And now he
decides on the future of [their] children? Excuse me?").
73. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 536-37, 724 P.2d 486,489-90,229 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 803-04 (1986).
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consider what is in the best interests of the child.74 However, many
courts require that the person seeking modification of an adjudicated
order demonstrate that a different arrangement would be in the
child's best interests due to a change in circumstances.75 In theory,
the changed circumstances rule "not only changes the burden of
persuasion but also limits the evidence cognizable by the court"76 to
considering the circumstances upon which the prior decision was
based and then inquiring whether the alleged new circumstances
represent a significant change requiring a re-evaluation of the child's
custody under the best interests standard.7 In practice, however,
even the changed circumstances rule allows for indeterminate and
speculative results when a judge must not only decide which criteria
under the relevant statutes to use, but also determine the weight to be
given to each of them.7"
Perhaps recognizing that practical distinctions between the best
interests standard and the changed circumstances rule is a somewhat
futile exercise because the same inquiry and net result may occur,
Pennsylvania simply gravitated to a direct best interests of the child
standard instead of a changed circumstances rule for modifications.79
In that vein the California Supreme Court aptly recognized that
[i]n most cases, of course, the changed-circumstance rule and
the best interest test produce the same result. When custody
continues over a significant period, the child's need for
continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important
role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that
74. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994).
75. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27
FAM. L.Q. 515, 595-99 (1994).
76. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 536, 724 P.2d at 489, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
77. Id at 534, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
78. Compare Gulyas v. Gulyas, 254 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that
change in custody to father was reasonable given mother's working status) with Anderson
v. Anderson, 863 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that despite suicide attempts
of mother and her present husband, mother's promiscuity, mother's inability to hold job,
and mother's violent nature, evidence supported trial court's decision not to change
custody); compare also Dabill v. Dabill, 514 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that child visitation interference does not establish grounds to modify custody) with Shunk
v. Walker, 589 A.2d 1303 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (holding that court may modify
custody when one parent sabotages visitation rights of other parent).
79. Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163 (Pa. 1993) (holding that change in circumstances
need not be shown for modification); McMillen v. McMillen, 602 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1992)
(holding that best interests rather than change in circumstances is appropriate standard in
modification proceedings).
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maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the
best interests of that child.
80
The court in Burchard v. Garay8 clarified that while it was not
extending the changed circumstances rule to protect a "de facto"'
custody arrangement,' it was affirming "the importance of protect-
ing established modes of custody, however created, not by limiting the
breadth of the evidence, but by requiring the noncustodial party to
show that a change would be in the best interests of the child."'
80. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 538,724 P.2d at 490-91,229 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05 (footnote
omitted).
81. 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986).
82. "De facto" as referred to here, and in the Burchard opinion, means custody
established without a court order. Id. at 537 n.3, 724 P.2d at 490 n.3, 229 Cal. Rptr at 804
n.3.
83. In a concurring opinion in Burchard, Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority on
this principle. He stated:
The majority's reading [of prior case law] as not extending the protection
of the changed-circumstances rule to so-called "de facto" as well as "de jure"
custody is sheer sophistry. [We have] expressly held that the rule applied
"regardless of how custody was originally decided'upon.. . . It is difficult for me
to conceive how we could have established the point more clearly... [F]amily
law would have been better served if [the majority] had followed the principle
declared therein.
Id. at 547, 724 P.2d at 497, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (Mosk, J., concurring).
84. It. at 537, 724 P.2d at 490, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (emphasis added). Justice Mosk
addressed the fact that "[t]he child whose custody was established by means other than
judicial decree has the same need for and right to stability and continuity." Id. at 547,724
P.2d at 497,229 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (Mosk, J., concurring). "[W]e may nevertheless presume
that such custody [established by agreement or by default] is in the child's best interest."
Id. at 548, 724 P.2d at 498, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk
opined that the presumption was justified because when parents agree to an arrangement
it is based upon their love, genuine concern for the child's welfare, and access to better
information. lId at 548-49, 724 P.2d at 498, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (Mosk, J., concurring).
In the case of custody established by default, Justice Mosk observed that as "between the
parent who undertakes to provide care and the parent who fails or refuses to do so,
custody with the former must be deemed to serve the child's best interests." Id. at 549,
724 P.2d at 498,229 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (Mosk, J., concurring). Thus, changing any custodial
arrangement that was based upon the child's best interests without "impos[ing] on the
noncustodial [parent] the burden of proving that a substantial change had occurred," id.
at 547, 724 P2d at 497, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (Mosk, J., concurring), frustrates a child's
well-recognized right to stability and continuity. The same concern is apparent when
courts (1) apply a presumption for continuity and stability, or (2) consider as a factor
which parent provided primary care for the child during the marriage, in determining what
is in the best interests of a child in a custody decision upon dissolution. See Andrea G.
Nadel, Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding
Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R.4TH 1129 (1985). Thus, "the importance of stability and
continuity in the life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption of
established patterns of care and emotional bonds," Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 541, 724 P.2d
at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07, can be addressed in a custody determination by
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Thus, according to the California Supreme Court, when a party seeks
a change in an adjudicated court order or when a custody pattern was
established by stipulation or default, the inquiry and outcome as to
whether there should be a change will be essentially the same. 5
Once a parent seeks custody at an initial proceeding, that parent will
have to show that it would be in the best interest of the child; this
would necessitate that the court examine the "established patterns of
care and emotional bonds." 6 Similarly, when a court modifies a
preexisting order, it must examine the conditions under which, and
reasons that, the current arrangements were ordered. 7  In either
case, the court must make the initial inquiry and then apply the best
interests of the child standard to determine whether a change in the
custody order or previous de facto arrangement is warranted.
Consequently, the speculativeness, indeterminacy, and related
problems that the best interests standard and the changed circum-
stances rule bring to custody determinations are present either when
custody or a change in custody is sought.88 And as the cases reveal,
when a mother's working status is a factor, it has only exacerbated the
problems outlined below.
B. Current Child Custody Law Allows Judges to Choose and
Weigh Which Factors Are Relevant-Facilitating
Discriminatory Decisions
When a court must determine whether to modify the status quo
by either changing an existing custody arrangement or imposing an
arrangement on a newly separated family that must have had an
established child-care pattern, the best interests standard that
ultimately comes into play "allows the judge to consider any fact that
may be deemed relevant to the child's welfare."'89 In California a
considering which parent primarily provided those needs for the child either during or
after marriage.
85. See Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 538-39, 724 P.2d at 490-91, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05.
86. Id at 541, 724 P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07.
87. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-22(d) (Bums Supp. 1994) (mandating that
courts not modify child custody orders unless it is in child's best interest and there has
been substantial and continuing change in one or more statutory factors rendering existing
custody order unreasonable).
88. See infra part IV.B.
89. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 70, at 466 (emphasis added); see also Jana B. Singer
& William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REv. 497, 519 (1988)
(stating that problems with best interests standard are "exacerbated by the multitude of
factors that judges typically are directed to consider in ascertaining a child's best
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court may consider the health, safety, and welfare of the child; any
history of abuse by one parent against the child or against the other
parent; and the nature and amount of contact with both parents."
And, during the pendency of a proceeding or anytime thereafter, the
judge may make a custody order "that seems necessary or proper.'
In other jurisdictions courts may consider the following statutory
factors: (1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties between the
parties and the child; (2) the capacity and disposition of the parents
to give the child love, affection, guidance, food, clothing, and medical
care; (3) the length of time a child has lived in a stable environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (4) the moral fitness of
the parties; and (5) any other factor considered by the court to be
relevant.9 2
While the statutes attempt to specify criteria for the judge to
consider-although most have "any other factor" or "necessary and
proper" loopholes-the statutes also allow the judge to determine the
weight to give each criterion.93 Even when a court has a presump-
tion in front of it, such as the primary caretaker presumption, or a
preference in favor of continuity and stability, a judge has the
discretion to find that other factors are more compelling-factors, in
other words, based upon the judge's own values.94
Determining custody, initially or in a modification proceeding,
necessarily requires a substantial degree of judicial forecasting.95
Proponents of the best interests standard, however, "believe that if
there is sufficient factual investigation, the court generally can
interests").
90. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994).
91. Id. § 3022.
92. See, eg., MICH. CoUP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23.3 (West Supp. 1983).
93. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 70, at 466-67 nn.51-52.
94. Id. at 467 n.52 ("The judge's response to different lifestyles,. .. child care patterns,
and the needs of the child for a mother's care or a father figure may affect the outcome
of the custody dispute."); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and
Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 622 (1992) ("The eventual determination can be
speculative and value-laden, as the standard encourages courts to assess the character of
the contestants ....").
95. In Coles v. Coles, 204 A.2d 330 (D.C. 1964), Judge Hood identified some of the
weaknesses of putting the best interests of the child standard into practice when he noted
that its
principle is-easily stated but its application in a particular case presents one of
the heaviest burdens that can be placed on a trial judge. Out of a maze of
conflicting testimony ... the judge must make a decision which will inevitably
affect materially the future life of an innocent child.
Id at 331-32.
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determine the custody placement that will be in the best interests of
the individual child."96 And experts point out that in performing
requisite factual investigations in individual cases, "judges sometimes
[defer generously] to the preferences of guardians ad litem, the
recommendations of social workers,"'  or evaluations performed by
private mental health professionals." This is believed to be impor-
tant because "[w]ithout the objective input of professionals ... the
needs of the child ... will be lost in the battle."99  Dr. Lionel
Margolin aptly pointed out that "lawyers cannot sift through all of the
psychological permutations when presenting a custody case on behalf
of their client."1"
Certain problems, however, inevitably arise when a judge relies
on mental health evaluations in a custody decision, either initially or
during a modification proceeding. These include the following: (1)
96. Cochran, supra note 49, at 25.
97. Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A
Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229, 242 (1993).
98. Cochran, supra note 49, at 27; see also Barbara A. Weiner et al., The Child
Custody Dispute, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 59, 60-61
(Diane H. Schetky & Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1985) (indicating that evaluator's points of
involvement in custody suit may arise "when the family first separates," "[wjhen a
contested custody case goes to trial," or "[a]fter the decree has been entered [and] one
party ... seek[s] a change in custody"). Dr. Lionel Margolin, Senior Consultant, Family
Law Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California, indicated that when
parents cannot agree as to who should have custody or whether a change in custody
should be made, the best interests of the child are necessarily determined by looking at
multiple factors such as the following: (1) how the child is doing under the current
scheme; (2) the parents' motivations for wanting custody; (3) the child's psychological
attachment to each parent; (4) the parents' relative care-taking abilities; (5) the
personalities of each parent; and (6) the age of the child. Interview with Dr. Lionel
Margolin, Senior Consultant, Family Law Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles
County, California, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Margolin Interview].
99. Weiner et al., supra note 98, at 59-60.
100. Margolin Interview, supra note 98. Dr. Margolin distinguished one of the most
important questions to ask when conducting a custody evaluation as, "Why are these
parents fighting?" Id. According to Dr. Margolin, "[w]hen you answer that question you
usually find out what the parenting plan should be." Id. In fact, one commentator has
even proposed that rather than using the vague and problematic best interests standard,
the proper inquiry in a custody decision should be "limited to a determination of the
reasons that the custody dispute has not been resolved through negotiation." Andrea
Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, in CHILD,
PARENT, & STATE 3, 13 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994). Charlow suggests that "[i]f
the inquiry in contested child custody cases is confined to determination of which parent
is best able to place the child's interests above his or her own in order to reduce conflict,"
id. at 18, "[i]t follows logically that the parent who is best able to separate parental discord
from his or her relations with the child should have custody," id. at 12; see supra note 37.
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The abnormal stress experienced during a custody dispute and
evaluation may cause a parent to behave differently than he or she
would under normal circumstances, thus complicating the evalua-
tion;'0 ' (2) assuming that there is a consensus among experts with
respect to the relevant aspects of psychological development-when
the experts agree there is not-courts may rely too heavily on one
opinion;"m (3) the difficulties fraught in translating the mental health
professional's opinions and findings into a workable court order
require lawyers and judges to capably reduce to writing complex
issues;103 (4) the money that could be used to directly benefit the
children in custody disputes might instead be "diverted to lawyers,
court fees and expert witnesses";" and finally, (5) even if a judge
has "all" of the "right" facts, he or she must ultimately "make an
individualized prediction about the future-with which parent will this
101. See Robert A. Burt, Experts, Custody Disputes, & Legal Fantasies, 14 PSYCHIATRIC
HOSP. 140, 141 (1983) ("The real question is whether any third party, judge or expert can
identify truly important differences ... and whether this identification of differences is
possible in the overheated context of a divorce custody dispute."); see also Mary Ann
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law,
60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986) (stating that indeterminacy of best interests standard
"asks the judge to do what is almost impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a
mother and a father at a time when family relations are apt to be most distorted by the
stress of separation and the divorce process itself"). According to Justice Richard Neely,
the effect of a custody evaluation on the parents is likened to "the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle-which refers to Werner Heisenberg's discovery that it is impossible to measure
both the speed and the location of an electron simultaneously because the measuring
devices themselves affect the speed and location being measured." RICHARD NEELY, THE
DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF ENDING A
MARRIAGE 67 (1984).
102. See NEELY, supra note 101, at 27; see also Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology:
Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1140 (1976)
("Empirical findings directly or indirectly relevant to questions for which judges deciding
difficult [custody] cases need answers are virtually nonexistent.").
103. According to Judith Wallerstein, "[t]he subtleties of psychological thinking and
shadings of individual difference that-are so critical to the perspective of the behavioral
scientist translate poorly into the arenas of court and legislature." Judith S. Wallerstein,
Children of Divorce: An Overview, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 105, 117 (1986).
104. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 520. Dr. Margolin estimates that the average
cost of a private mental health custody evaluation is between $3000 and $4000. Margolin
Interview, supra note 98. There are less costly alternatives to private mental health
evaluations in some jurisdictions. For instance, some family courts offer those services
based upon sliding fee scales or fee waivers. Id. However, parents may find that they are
placed on long waiting lists and that they have little or no choice in the evaluators-who
are sometimes student workers. Id. Thus, cost and other factors prevent courts and most
parents from obtaining what is considered by mental health professionals to be an
adequate evaluation. Cochran, supra note 49, at 27-28.
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child be better off in the years to come?"1 5 In this regard Judge
Hood recognized the indeterminacy and speculativeness of judicial
forecasting in custody decisions. The judge's wisdom would naturally
apply to determining custody in a modification setting as well. He
stated:
After attempting to appraise and compare the personalities
and capabilities of the two parents, the judge must endeavor
to look into the future and decide that the child's best
interests will be served if committed to the custody of the
father or mother.... When the judge makes his decision,
he has no assurance that his decision is the right one. He
can only hope that he is right. He realizes that another
equally able and conscientious judge might have arrived at a
different decision on the same evidence'0
6
C Indeterminate Standards Encourage Nonprimary Caretaking
Parents to Litigate Custody and Noncustodial
Parents to Seek Modifications-Creating Harm and a
Lack of Finality in the Child's Life
"Because each parent can often make plausible arguments why
a child would be better off with him or her, the [best interests] test
creates a greater incentive to litigate than would a more determinate
custody standard. ''""7 Not only do the changed circumstances rule
and best interests standard provide parents with an opportunity to
prove up their relative value as the custodial parent, they also
encourage parents to publicly find fault with each other..8 whenever
105. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 519; see also Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357, 361 (W. Va. 1981) ("[I]n the average divorce proceeding intelligent determination of
relative degrees of fitness requires a degree of precision of measurement which is not
possible given the tools available to judges."); Cochran, supra note 49, at 25 ("One of the
major sources of disagreement between those who advocate the case-by-case rule and
those who oppose it is the question of whether a judge actually can determine what
placement will be in the best interests of the child in a significant number of cases.").
106. Coles, 204 A.2d at 332 (emphasis added); see, eg., infra part V.B.
107. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 520.
108. Scott, supra note 94, at 622 ("The wide-open inquiry that the [best interests]
standard invites often devolves into a destructive contest in which each parent competes
to expose the flaws of the other.") On this point Professor Jon Elster argued "that the
best interest principle is usually indeterminate when both parents pass the threshold of
absolute fitness." Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child,
54 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 21 (1987); see also Burt, supra note 101, at 141 ("[T]he attempt to
determine which parent is the better child custodian depends on such fine-grained
distinctions as to make this, in the context of a custody dispute, a choice between two
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they may feel there is any benefit to the child-or to them-
selvesl'--to do so. Thus, litigation is invited at any time when
there is no other standard"0 but that a court must determine what
is in the child's best interests by measuring, according to the judge's
values, the relative worth to the child of two fit parents."'
Additionally, because "[s]ettlement takes place in light of what
the parties expect to happen if there is litigation,"" the indetermi-
nate and speculative nature of custody decisions under current child
custody law leaves the parties' expectations up in the air"---and
with it, in some cases, the prospect of settlement." In other words,
rather than reaching a settlement or maintaining the status quo, a par-
ent-for any reason, at any time-may choose to roll the dice. And
what is essential to consider is that a custody battle, at any time in the
essentially indistinguishable alternatives, between Tweedle-Dee and Tweedle-Dum.").
109. See, e.g., discussion infra note 126 (revealing that nonprimary caretaker may
dispute custody, or noncustodial parent may bring modification proceeding, in order to
shift child support burden).
110. Recall that even in situations where a court must first consider a changed
circumstances rule, the analysis still ultimately boils down to whether the proposed change
is in the child's best interests. See discussion supra part IV.A-B. Once the court begins
to consider whether there has been a significant change in circumstances, and then what
is in the child's best interests, it has the discretion to determine the weight to be given to
the different factors considered under both the rule and the standard. Scott & Derdeyn,
supra note 70, at 466-67 n.51. Put another way, in determining whether a custody change
is in the best interests of a child, a judge can determine the weight to be given-according
to his or her values-to the proposed change versus other factors. In the end the judge
can weigh, for example, the effects of a custody change on a child in light of the custodial
parent's need to place the child in daycare versus the noncustodial parent's ability to
provide an in-home mother substitute.
111. See Elster, supra note 108, at 24 ("By virtue of its finely tuned character, the [best
interests] principle invites protracted litigation.").
112. Cochran, supra note 49, at 18. Settlement negotiations have been described as
"bargaining in the shadow of the law." Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
113. Bahr et al., supra note 66, at 248. "Every negotiation is influenced and constrained
by the negotiators' perceptions of the legal system." Id. (citing Robert H. Mnookin,
Divorce Bargaining: The Limits of Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015 (1985);
see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 10, at 48).
114. See Cochran, supra note 49, at 18; see also Glendon, supra note 101, at 1181
(stating that best interests standard's "vagueness provides maximum incentive to those who
are inclined to wrangle over custody"). "Under the case-by-case best interests rule it is
more difficult for the parents to determine what custody arrangement will be ordered if
there is litigation. Parents do not know which of the numerous criteria that a judge might
consider will be most influential on the judge." Cochran, supra note 49, at 18 (footnote
omitted).
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child's life, is the thing furthest from what is in the best interests of
a child.115
Inherent-and harmful-in the indeterminacy and speculativeness
of current child custody law is that it also promotes a lack of
resolution and finality in custody decisions. "As changes occur in the
lives of children and parents, one party may [at any time] seek legal
modification of [custody]."" 6 Additionally, one study indicated:
Among the 10 percent of our total sample who filed a
motion to modify custody ... [i]n the 1990-93 period, 83
percent of those who sought a custody modification were
granted the request by the judge. Thus, most divorced
persons did not return to court to change custody, but those
who did were usually successful.' 7
115. E.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981) ("[I]t is emphatically
the case that [full-blown hearings on child custody between two fit parents] do not enhance
justice, particularly since custody fights are highly destructive to the emotional health of
children."); see also Bahr et al., supra note 66, at 262 ("Research has consistently shown
that the adjustment of children of divorce is better if children... are not caught between
or imbued in the conflicts of their parents."); Cochran, supra note 49, at 17-19 (stating that
"increased parental conflict is emotionally destructive to children, especially when the
conflict occurs after the parents separate" (footnote omitted)); Singer & Reynolds, supra
note 89, at 520 (stressing that "increased potential for litigation causes substantial
psychological harm to children"); Wallerstein, supra note 103, at 105 (indicating that
significant numbers of children of divorce show lasting difficulties from stress related to
marital breakdown and are at risk of suffering subsequent psychological problems); Judith
S. Wallerstein, The Overburdened Chil* Some Long-Term Sequelae of Divorce, 30 Soc.
WORK 116 (1985) (recognizing that burden of supporting structure of family during
litigation between parents often falls heavily on children). One expert noted the following,
which is true of any custody battle:
The adversarial nature of the legal process... can be disastrous to families
contesting custody. The adversarial viewpoint presumes a zero-sum game men-
tality according to which one parent "wins," one parent "loses," and the child
loses a parent in the process....
The child who is the subject/object of a custody contest faces crises at the
personal, interpersonal and existential levels. The contested child's attention and
emotions are diverted from developmentally appropriate interests to the family
crisis at hand. Children's needs and concerns are eclipsed by those of distraught
adults. Normally devoted, consistent mothers and fathers may regress under the
strain of their losses and find themselves exhausted to the point of virtual
emotional unavailability.
Richard Wolman & Keith Taylor, Psychological Effects of Custody Disputes on Children,
9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 399, 406 (1991).
116. Bahr et al., supra note 66, at 259.
117. Id at 261. Moreover, according to Nancy Polikoff,
1w]hen fathers do want custody, their chances of winning are substantial....
T] he statistics that have been gathered do not support the claims of the "fathers'
rights" movement. Lenore J. Weitzman and Ruth B. Dixon found in a study
CHILDLESS MOTHERS?
The likelihood of success when requesting a change in custody,
coupled with the lack of a more determinate standard upon which
parents may rely and possibly reach settlement without court
intervention, could make litigation more likely when a conflict of any
nature arises between divorced or divorcing parents. Such litigation,
or the bargaining that may take place in anticipation of it, has proven
to be uniquely harmful to working mothers."' This in turn means
that even if a custody determination is finally made, the prospect of
another change always remains within the realm of possibility-and
indeed quite likely in cases where some conflict arises between the
parents." 9
In recommending that all custody decrees be final, the authors of
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child" stressed the importance of
safeguarding "the child's need for continuity."'' Other commenta-
tors agree:
Children who are the objects of custody disputes live in
a limbo in which adjustment is not possible because there is
no resolution to which to adjust. The custody dispute may
drag on for months or years, and once decided, may be re-
limited to Los Angeles County that in 1977, 63% of all fathers who requested
custody in court papers were successful. A study of 196 Minneapolis cases
showed fathers winning 45% of the time. One New York family court judge
awarded custody to men as often as to women during a five-year period in the
1970s. Two researchers who surveyed North Carolina judges in 1979 found that
fathers prevailed in almost one-half of the cases.
Polikoff, supra note 10, at 177 (footnotes omitted). These statistics refer to custody
decisions made at an initial proceeding, as opposed to the study discussed above. In either
case, it is readily apparent that the incentive to litigate custody at any point by attempting
to use the primary caretaker's working status as a determinative factor is increased under
the best interests standard.
118. See infra part IV.D.
119. It has been pointed out that "[f]ormal attempts to modify custody are most likely
to occur if there is a conflict between the parents." Bahr et al., supra note 66, at 259.
Moreover, for both obvious and numerous reasons, "[t]he intensity of conflict is likely to
be greater in child custody cases than it is in other types of litigation," Cochran, supra note
49, at 18-19, thereby directly harming the children involved.
120. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38
(1984).
121. Id. at 37. Accordingly, the authors stated that "[t]he lack of finality [in child
placement proceedings in divorce], which stems from the court's retention of jurisdiction
over its custody decision, invites challenges by a disappointed party claiming changed
circumstances. This ... concomitant increase in opportunities for appeal are in conflict
with the child's need for continuity." I&.
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opened upon petition by either party .... The threat of loss
or unwelcome change is constant....'22
Moreover, indeterminate standards, manifested in the wide discretion
the current custody laws grant judges," force primary caretaking or
custodial working mothers to live with-and gauge their familial and
career decisions upon-"the certainty of uncertainty.
124
D. Indeterminate Standards Affect Parents' Pre- and Post-Divorce
Financial Bargaining Power and Their Relative
Post-Divorce Economic Positions
"[C]ustody is often used as a bargaining tool to obtain more
advantageous financial settlements."1" Courts have recognized that
this phenomenon operates to the detriment of both the child and the
parent who has been primarily responsible for caring for the child. In
modification cases a change in custody often means a shift in the
child-support obligation. 26 In other words, when the primary
122. Wolman & Taylor, supra note 115, at 407 (emphasis added).
123. Schneider, supra note 97, at 229 (stating that "[t]he best-interests-of-the-child
standard has long been understood to give judges acres of room to roam").
124. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's
Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. Rav. 2215, 2282 (1991).
125. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 182-83.
126. "Most child support guidelines are based on the assumption that one parent will
have custody of the children most of the time." Victoria M. Ho, Support for Second
Families, FAM. ADVOC., 1993, at 40, 43. Thus, the parent with whom the child lives will
be the recipient of the child-support award. See id In a study of joint custody situations,
where two-thirds of fathers paid support, "lower child-support awards were... related to
increasing numbers of overnight visits." Teitelbaum, supra note 1, at 1825. Therefore,
with a joint custody decree, child support may also vary in direct relation to where the
child spends most of its time. See id "The movement toward gender equality ... has
made it possible for mothers to be ordered to pay alimony and child support." Bahr et
al., supra note 66, at 264. While fathers still pay the majority of child support "due to the
[relatively] low[er] earning capacity of divorced women," id., it is "expect[ed] that the
number of women [who will be] required to pay child support will increase" if women's
relative earning capacity does likewise over time. Id. Clearly, the financial benefits of
obtaining-or effecting bargaining by seeking to obtain-custody currently favors fathers.
Reviewing the research of Maccoby and Mnookin, cited supra note 10, one commentator
noted the following:
At divorce, the standard of living for both parties declined. However, the
situation of mothers with primary custody was worse than that of fathers. Within
six months after separation, employed mothers earned an average salary of
$18,000; their husbands were earning $34,000, almost twice as much. Almost all
of these custodial mothers received child support, averaging $300 per month.
Removing this amount from the father and giving it to the mother, the former's
income fell to $30,400 and the mother's rose to $21,600, reducing the income
gap. However, the mother's adjusted income supported both herself and her
child.
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caretaking or custodial parent with "deep ties to a child and a strong
desire for custody"'" is "[flaced with the uncertainty of child
placement,'' 8 under an indeterminate custody standard, that
parent-usually the mother'g--is "likely to sacrifice fair child
support, spousal support, and property division for custody."'"
Typically, the needs of the child and the financial resources of the
parties provide the basis for child support.' However, when the
primary caretaker or custodial parent is not confident that he or she
will win in a custody fight or modification proceeding, "there is a
great danger that another factor will enter into the settlement
decision:m" fear. "The case may be settled out of court, but not
until one parent has forfeited valuable rights in order to avoid a
Teitelbaum, supra note 1, at 1825 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also WErrZMAN,
supra note 3, at 323 (revealing studies that show that after divorce women tend to
experience significant decline while men experience substantial increase in their relative
economic living standards).
Consider also how the issue of child support triggered the child custody cases of
Jennifer Ireland and Marcia Clark, and how child support was affected in the case of
Eileen Adams. See supra part II. Tony Award-winning actress Tonya Pinkins shared this
personal observation on network television:
Suddenly men are seeing that if they get custody, they get money. My ex was
awarded $25,000 a year in child support, half of that for child care for 50 hours
a week. I don't work 50 hours a week, but I'm not allowed to see my children
and I have to pay for someone else to take care of them.
Oprah Transcript, supra note 6, at 11.
127. Cochran, supra note 49, at 16.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 10.
130. Cochran, supra note 49, at 16.
The loss of children is a terrifying specter to concerned and loving parents;
however, it is particularly terrifying to the primary caretaker parent who, by
virtue of the caretaking function, was closest to the child before the divorce or
other proceedings were initiated....
Since the parent who is not the primary caretaker is usually in the superior
financial position, the subsequent welfare of the child depends to a substantial
degree upon the level of support payments which are awarded in the course of
a divorce. Our experience instructs us that uncertainty about the outcome of
custody disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the
child in return for lower alimony and child support payments.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981) (emphasis added); see also Singer &
Reynolds, supra note 89, at 520 ("Uncertainty about the outcome of custody disputes ...
is particularly damaging to the primary caretaker parent who may be willing to sacrifice
everything in order to avoid the terrifying prospect of losing custody through the
unpredictable process of litigation.").
131. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIvORCE Acr § 309, 9A U.L.A. 167 (1979);
Margaret Campbell Haynes, Understanding the Guidelines and the Rules, FAM. ADVOC.,
1993, at 14, 14.
132. Cochran, supra note 49, at 15.
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custody battle."'' The parent who was not the primary caretaker
during the marriage or by default, or who was not the primary
custodial parent after marriage, can threaten a custody fight-even if
that parent does not want custody-"in order to obtain concessions
... on financial issues.""IM This result directly harms a child's best
interests because "[w]hen such bargaining takes place, child support
is not based on the proper factors"'---most importantly, the child's
needs.
136
Moreover, "by virtue of being the primary caretaker, such a
parent [is] likely to be the economically disadvantaged one."'37
Thus, not only is "the bargaining process particularly unfair, but..,
the high costs of contested litigation [make it] less accessible to that
parent."'38  The Garska v. McCoy" court recognized that "it is
likely that the primary caretaker will have less financial security than
the nonprimary caretaker and, consequently, will be unable to sustain
the expense of custody litigation."'
Child support awards that are not based upon the child's needs
and the relative financial resources of the parties reduce the material
standard of living of the custodial parent and the child.' Because
mothers are most often the primary custodial parent, 4 2 women and
children are affected the most. Well documented research attests to
the reduced standard of living of mothers and children following
divorce. 43 The reduced standard of living-caused in part by ini-
133. Charlow, supra note 100, at 15. "Since trial court judges generally approve
consensual agreements on child support, underlying economic data which bear upon the
equity of settlements are seldom investigated at the time an order is entered." Garska, 278
S.E.2d at 360.
134. Cochran, supra note 49, at 15. Lenore Weitzman found that one-third of the
mothers in divorce situations reported that their husbands had used the threat of a custody
dispute in financial negotiations. WErrZMAN, supra note 3, at 310.
135. Cochran, supra note 49, at 16-17.
136. See id.
137. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 183 (discussing Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362).
138. Id.; see also Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 520 ("[lit is likely that the
primary caretaker, who has traded career for childraising, will be less able financially to
sustain the expense of a custody fight.").
139. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
140. Id at 362.
141. See discussion supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 10.
143. E.g., Herma Hill Kay, New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORcE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 18-34 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herna Hill Kay eds., 1990);
WErrZMAN, supra note 3, at 337-40.
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tially unequal bargaining power and resources,'" in part by womens'
overall lower earning capacity,45 and in part by the fact that the
primary caretaker or custodial parent's income will support herself
and her children -- forces only the primary caretaker or custodial
parent to face the Catch-22. The mother may presently have little or
no choice about working more hours or working at all, yet by doing
so she risks losing custody.47 The Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court commented on the unfair burden that would fall most
heavily on women should a "court's ruling.. . assum[e] that there is
a negative relation between a woman's lack of wealth or her need or
desire to work and the quality of her parenting."'" Chief Justice
Bird concluded: "To force women into the marketplace and then to
penalize them for working would be cruel."'
149
E. Working Mothers and Fathers Have Been Held to Different
Standards When Courts Evaluate Whether They Are
Serving Their Child's Best Interests
"Are working mothers held to a higher standard of parenting
than working fathers?"'" Some commentators have observed that
this double standard exists in society. "Women are supposed to be
home with the children, and when they are not, it is proof they are
poor parents. Men are not supposed to be home with their children,
and when they show minimal devotion, it is proof they are superior
parents."'' But when courts hold working mothers to a different
standard than working fathers,5 2 the result is harmful to children,
144. See discussion supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 126; see also Polikoff, supra note 10, at 179 n.34 ("Recent
government data reveals that there is no job category in which women earn more than or
as much as men. The total ratio of female to male earnings is 64.7%. Women sales
workers earn 52% of what male sales workers earn. Even in the nursing profession, which
is 90.9% female, women earn only 94.7% of what men earn.").
146. See supra notes 3, 126.
147. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 544-45, 724 P.2d 486, 495, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800,
809 (1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring) ("If she did not work ... [s]he would risk losing
custody to a father who could provide [more material advantages for the child].... If she
did work, she would face the prejudicial view that a working mother is by definition
inadequate, dissatisfied with her role, or more concerned with her own needs than with
those of her child.").
148. Id at 541-42, 724 P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 807 (Bird, CJ., concurring).
149. 1d. at 546, 724 P.2d at 496, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
150. Abcarian, supra note 38, at El.
151. Id. at El, E4.
152. In Burchard v. Garay, Chief Justice Bird cited numerous examples of cases where
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devastating to the primary caretaking or custodial mother, and "a
custody award [that] is of dubious constitutionality." '
"Sharon Prost, chief counsel to U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah, lost custody of her two sons when a judge found her to be
'devoted to and absorbed by her work and career ... The
judge made this decision even though the evidence in the case
revealed that "Prost rose at 5:30 a.m. each day to play with the boys,
often took them to school and participated in many school activi-
ties.'1 55  "By contrast, the judge praised Prost's husband for being
with the boys in the evenings before they went to bed, for being
involved in the older boy's school and generally displaying a more
nurturing demeanor.' ' 156  A court-appointed psychologist, however,
found both parents to be "very genuinely and deeply involved with
the children."' 57 Finally, the court record revealed that the judge
made no mention of the fact that Prost's husband had been unem-
ployed "for better than a year and during that time, the children were
mostly in the care of others.' 5  In an amicus brief filed with the
mothers' working status was found to be a negative factor in a child custody decision,
whereas fathers' working status either was not, or was held to be a factor that favored him
as the custodial parent. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531,543-46 & nn.5-6, 724 P.2d 486,
494-96 & nn.5-6, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 808-09 & nn.5-6 (1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring). In
one case "the reviewing court affirmed a custody award to a working father because 'he
is in a position to lend more stability and guidance.. . .' As the wife had forsaken a career
during the marriage to care for the children, the husband's earning capacity was
substantially greater than hers." Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (quoting Porter v. Porter, 274
N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (N.D. 1979)). Chief Justice Bird observed that "[ijt was this greater
earning capacity which apparently was the source of his 'stability and guidance.'" Id
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (quoting Porter, 274 N.W.2d at 246). The Chief Justice also noted
a case in which a court of appeal "dismissed the notion that the father's performance as
an 'excellent custodial parent' was impaired by placing the child in nursery school at the
minimum age of two years on a nearly full-time basis." Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing
In re Marriage of Levin, 102 Cal. App. 3d 981, 983 n.1, 162 Cal. Rptr. 757,758 n.1 (1980)).
In yet another case, "[t]he reviewing court made no negative comments about the child's
placement in day care, but rather emphasized that the father often prepared the child's
breakfast and dinner and picked her up from the day care center himself." Id (Bird, C.J.,
concurring) (citing In re Marriage of Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)). Chief
Justice Bird remarked, "It is difficult to imagine a mother's performance of these chores
even attracting notice, much less commendable comment." Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).
153. Id. at 543, 724 P.2d at 494, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
154. Betty Holcomb, Working Mothers on Trial, WORKING MOTHER, Jan. 1995, at 29,
29 (quoting Judge Harriet Taylor).
155. Id at 30.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id
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court, the Women's Legal Defense Fund noted that the father's
"decision not to care for his own children received no criticism from
the court .... Had the situation been reversed, and Ms. Prost been
the one home alone and unemployed, it is unlikely that the court
would have found it acceptable.'
5 9
Nancy Polikoff opined that when courts place a priority on the
economic circumstances of the parties in determining which parent
can provide for the child's material needs, the obvious result "almost
preclude[s] mothers from obtaining custody of their children.""6 In
Dempsey v. Dempsey, 6' the trial court awarded custody of three
children to their working father because he was in the better financial
position to provide for them.'6 "The facts revealed not only that
the mother had been the children's primary caretaker, but that the
youngest child needed home therapy for epilepsy which only the
mother knew how to give."' ' "She had also done all the house-
work, chauffeuring, and parent-teacher activities during the marriage.
As a result, her earning ability was low."'6 "The trial court judge,
in reserving a ruling on the mother's obligation to pay child support,
suggested that she might fulfill this obligation by serving as the
children's regular babysitter!"'1
159. l.
160. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 178.
Attaching such importance to economic capacity is not only an obvious burden
upon most mothers seeking custody, but it is also a departure from the
customary concept that, first, custody is decided according to the best interests
of the child and, then, to equalize the financial burden, child support payments
are ordered.
kd at 179; see also Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 539, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06
("If in fact the custodial parent's income is insufficient to provide proper care for the child,
the remedy is to award child support, not to take away custody."). But see Porter v.
Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979) (awarding custody to working father based upon his
ability to provide economic stability as opposed to primary caretaking mother with
substantially less earning power).
161. 292 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
162. Id. at 553-54. It should be noted that the record revealed that "the mother's
impetus for the divorce was the father's lack of interest in family life. The father ...
frequently missed dinner with the family ... and spent his leisure time bowling and on
snowmobile trips without the family." Polikoff, supra note 10, at 178 (discussing
Dempsey).
163. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 178.
164. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 544 n.5, 724 P.2d at 495 n.5, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.5
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (discussing Dempsey).
165. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 178; see Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 544 n.5, 724 P.2d at 495
n.5, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.5 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Ms. Polikoff commended the
insightful reasoning of the Dempsey appellate court in that it wanted to reverse the trial
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Ms. Polikoff's observation that "[t]he flip side of penalizing
working mothers with limited financial resources due to sporadic or
part-time employment is penalizing mothers who work full-time for
not being sufficiently available to their children""' exposes the
double-edged sword working mothers face. For example, the Gulyas
v. Gulyas67 decision demonstrates, once again, the differing stan-
dards to which courts have held working mothers and fathers in
custody disputes."
In Gulyas the father worked a standard forty-hour week; the
mother, a regional manager for H & R Block, worked forty to fifty
hours per week during tax season and ten to thirty hours per week at
other times.'69 The mother was able to leave her work during the
day if necessary; she was home when her daughter left for school and
picked her up at a neighbor's home one and one-half hours after
school ended. 7 The father, a full-time pipe coverer at Ford Motor
Company, was unable to leave work during the day and was already
at work when his daughter left for school.' At trial "there was no
evidence that the father spent more time with his daughter than the
mother did. The record offered no factual support for an implicit
finding that the mother's career, and not the father's, interfered with
[caring for the child]."'" The trial judge noted that the mother,
with whom the child had resided for over one and one-half years since
the marital separation, was an "ambitious career woman."'7 "Re-
search into the lower court record showed that in a five page opinion,
the trial judge mentioned the mother's working eleven times. ' 4
And, "[i]n a revealing comment, this judge stated that the marriage
court. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 178. However, rather than reversing and awarding
custody to the mother, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial judge for a new
determination. Id.
166. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 179.
167. 254 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
168. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 545 n.6, 724 P.2d at 496 n.6, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10 n.6
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (stating that Gulyas is another example of double standard where
working "mother-and not the father-[is] penalized for working out of the home");
Polikoff, supra note 10, at 180-81.
169. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 545 n.6, 724 P.2d at 496 n.6, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10 n.6
(Bird, C.J., concurring); Polikoff, supra note 10, at 180.
170. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 545 n.6, 724 P.2d at 496 n.6, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 810 n.6
(Bird, CJ., concurring); Polikoff, supra note 10, at 180.
171. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 180.
172. 1
173. 1
174. liL
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was 'normal until the wife felt compelled to go to work to help
support the family."' 17 s
On appeal, the dissenting judge in Gulyas observed "that the
mother's offer to quit her job would disadvantage her in her ability
to provide for the material needs of her daughter, thus placing her in
a 'Catch-22' situation."'176
V. RECOMMENDATION
This Comment recommends that when two otherwise fit parents
cannot reach or maintain an agreement as to the custody disposition
of their children, the court should apply a presumption favoring-as
much as possible-previously established child-care patterns.'" It
is essential to the underlying purposes of the presumption that it be
rebutted only by an objective standard of fitness. Anything less
would thwart the desired goal of alleviating the indeterminacy in
custody decisions by maintaining the same wide-open, value-laden
inquiry currently in place.78 A deficiency in care that results in
neglect would of course be a proper consideration for a court. But if
the primary caretaking or custodial parent began working or went
back to school, then absent actual neglect it would not be in the best
interests of the children to allow a wide-open inquiry into "who is the
better parent now," further disrupting the children's lives. 79
175. Id (emphasis added) (quoting trial judge).
176. Id.
177. This standard is very similar to the primary-caretaker standard found, for example,
in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). A similar approach was taken in
Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986). In Burchard,
the California Supreme Court enunciated, inter alia, a preference for continuity, stability,
and preservation of patterns of care and emotional bonds in custody arrangements. I&
at 535,724 P.2d at 488,229 Cal. Rptr. at 802; see also In re Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725,731 n.4,
598 P.2d 36, 41 n.4, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 nA (1979) (stating that established mode of
custody should be preserved unless significant change in circumstances indicates that
different arrangement would be best, "regardless of how custody was originally decided
upon"). For a discussion of another "rose by any other name" standard or presumption
valuing past patterns of care, see the argument for the "Approximation Approach"
advanced by Elizabeth S. Scott in Scott, supra note 94.
178. See supra part IV.A-C. "[I]n the interest of removing the issue of child custody
from the type of acrimonious and counter-productive litigation which a procedure inviting
exhaustive evidence will inevitably create" the court adopted "a presumption in favor of
the primary caretaker parent, if he or she meets the minimum, objective standard for being
a fit parent .... ." Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362 (emphasis added).
179. See discussion infra part V.A, C.
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While the California Supreme Court did not define "an actual
deficiency in care," it absolutely created a bright-line rule as to what
is not an actual deficiency." ° The primary caretaker's working,
studying, and relying on daycare and babysitting-even when the'
other parent can provide an in-home mother substitute-are
insufficient reasons to remove custody of the child from the primary
caretaker.'8' Thus, to ensure certainty in the outcome of custody
disputes for the numerous reasons outlined in this Comment, the
primary caretaker's work, school, or reliance on day care would not
be a proper consideration for courts absent a showing of neglect."
In addition to requiring a showing of unfitness, to warrant a
disruption in the child's life, courts applying a presumption favoring
previously existing patterns of care must take care not to allow
proceedings to become an opportunity for the wide-open, value-laden
choice between two fit parents on another level. The argument exists
that it is all but impossible to recreate "previously established patterns
of care" in any postdissolution situation, much less when the primary
caretaker goes back to work or school. That issue is squarely
addressed in this Comment."8' However, there is also the possibility
that circumstances in a child's life may change on a permanent and
substantial basis. In that situation, court intervention may be
warranted. For example, a child would be significantly deprived of
contact with the noncustodial parent if the primary caretaker or
custodial parent needed or wanted to make a residential move. Or
the situation could arise in which the primary caretaking or custodial
parent were unable to provide care for extended and regular periods
of time. In those cases, the presumption is defeated because
previously existing patterns of care are not replicated at all. Courts
must be careful to distinguish among these cases as discussed in this
Comment.' 84 Moreover, the proper inquiry then is to begin not by
weighing "who is the better parent now," but by asking how the child
is doing in the current situation.""
Naturally, if circumstances changed on a substantial and perma-
nent basis, and parents could not agree on how to address those
180. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492,229 Cal. Rptr. at 806; see infra notes
232-35 and accompanying text.
181. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
182. See supra part IV; infra part V.
183. See infra part V.A.
184. See supra notes 98, 100; infra note 227.
185. See infra note 227.
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changes in terms of child custody, court intervention might be
warranted. Examples of permanent changes might include: (1) The
primary caretaker's job requires a residential move such that the
child's regular contact with the other parent is deprived; (2) the
primary caretaker takes an employment position in which he or she
must make frequent and lengthy trips away from home such that he
or she cannot provide actual care for extended, regular periods of time;
or (3) the primary custodial parent decides to put the children in
boarding school. Certainly, one could theorize over definitions-how
often is frequent or regular?, how long is lengthy or extended?-until
the cows come home. Realistically, however, significant and perma-
nent disruptions to previously existing child-care patterns are readily
distinguishable from situations in which the primary caretaker or
custodial parent must begin working but still comes home each
night,"' or experiences a temporary situation that disrupts the
child's routine, such as an illness or a uniquely taxing job assignment
like Marcia Clark's role in the O.J Simpson trial. Moreover, it has
been argued that "[w]hatever harm a mechanical application of the
rule [favoring continuity and stability] poses in unusual circumstances
... can readily be prevented by permitting a pragmatic exception.
The rule therefore should not be discarded; it should simply be
modified if and when the need arises."' "ar
Attorney Stacy D. Phillips has practiced Family Law in Los
Angeles, California for approximately eleven years."8 She suggests,
in some situations, that parents have a mutual "first right of refusal"
plan allowing one parent to fill in as the child's caretaker should the
other parent be unavailable.'89 In situations involving a temporary
disruption-for example, when the primary custodial parent has a
temporary job assignment, is taking a class two nights a week, or
becomes ill, a first right of refusal plan would allow the nonprimary
caretaking parent to fill in as the child's caretaker during those hours
that the primary caretaking parent is unavailable. This Author would
add to that suggestion that if the nonprimary caretaker were to rely
in turn on other child care arrangements, the child would not enjoy
186. See infra part V.A.
187. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 551, 724 P.2d at 500, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
188. Interview with Stacy D. Phillips, Family Law Attorney, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar.
17, 1995) [hereinafter Phillips Interview].
189. 1&
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the benefit of being with one of its parents-and the whole point to
the parent's first right of refusal concept would be defeated. In other
words, the first right of refusal opportunity would attach only to the
child's parent personally. Moreover, Ms. Phillips added words of
wisdom about the first right of refusal proposition that one of her
clients, a divorced father with primary caretaking responsibility for his
child, shared with her: "Arranging for the nonprimary caretaker to
pinch hit when child care is needed must be subject to practicality,
workability, and the convenience of all parties."'" Thus, if the two
parents did not live close together, or their relationship were such that
transitioning the child from household to household would be
disruptive in itself, such an arrangement might be impractical or
unworkable.'91
An important distinction to bear in mind is that when a change
in the primary caretaker's situation is permanent, it still might not
properly be deemed significant enough to further alter child-care
patterns and modes of living. To reason that certain permanent
changes necessitate changing child care routines even further flies in
the face of common sense"9 and subverts the reasoning of the
California Supreme Court."9
In the divorce context, the presumption in favor of previously
existing child-care patterns is a healthy step away from a judge's
highly discretionary pick between two parents'94 or splitting custody
190. Id
191. Id Another client of Ms. Phillips' told her that he did not care for the first right
of refusal plan. He felt that it would be less disruptive for the children when he was away
if they knew that they could remain at home, in their own environment, whether or not
he was there. Id
192. See infra part V.A.
193. See Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540-41, 724 P.2d at 492-93, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07
(stating that altering bonds because primary caretaking parent begins working or studying
is unreasonable absent neglect); In re Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725,740,598 P.2d 36,44,157 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 391 (1979) (noting that altering established modes of living because primary
caretaking parent became permanently disabled is unreasonable).
194. See, eg., supra part IV.A-B.
By contrast, "[a] custody decision rule that seeks to approximate past patterns of care
will demand a narrower, more quantitative inquiry than the best interests standard
requires. In most cases, only, factual evidence relating to parental participation in the
child's life during the marriage will be relevant under the framework." Scott, supra note
94, at 637. Thus, rather than relying on expert opinion chock full of future speculation and
judicial forecasting, the presumption in favor of previously established child-care patterns
employs a retrospective, forensic review of parents' interactions and responsibilities. Put
another way, it looks to the past caretaking functions performed by each of the parents.
It focuses on "the extent to which the parent engaged in tasks that contributed to the
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of the child.' 95 If both parents have been active caretakers, the
child should not be made to suffer a disruption from the previous
child-care pattern by being denied equal access to each parent. On
the other hand, if one parent has had more involvement in caring for
the child, the bonds that have thereby been established should be
valued and preserved.' 96 And in those cases in which there is
clearly a primary caretaker, the role of the nonprimary caretaking
parent should of course be recognized."9
In a modification proceeding, when one parent has been the
custodial parent for some time, established patterns of care are more
readily apparent. Just as in the initial adjudicated decision upon
child's basic care and development, and the parent's participation in decisions relevant to
the child." Id. at 637-38. Thus, this evidence does not provide a basis for choosing one
parent over the other because of who is "best," but rather uses as a basis the parents' prior
roles when allocating future time between each parent and the child. Id. at 638. As a
result the "incentive to exhume every vestige of unsavory evidence," id., about the other
spouse's character is reduced-to the benefit of everyone, most importantly the child. See
supra part IV.C.
195. Absent parental discord, and assuming that factors such as geographics are in
place, truly sharing joint physical custody of the child may actually be best. See, eg., Scott
& Derdeyn, supra note 70; Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 518 (stating that "sharing,
unaccompanied by strife" may benefit child); infra notes 211, 225, 218. This Comment,
however, discusses only those situations in which parents cannot reach or maintain an
agreement as to the custody disposition of their children. Professors Singer and Reynolds
point out that parents who are caring, motivated, and of sufficient wealth to manage truly
sharing custody of their children do not need a judicial order to achieve joint custody.
Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 518. By definition when parents no longer agree, a
joint award is probably unworkable, and it thereby becomes more important to have a
standard that establishes a degree of certainty in the outcome of custody proceedings. See,
e.g., id. at 518-23. Moreover, even when there is an absence of dispute, joint physical
custody arrangements do not seem to be favored by parents. See infra notes 213-19 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the value versus the viability of joint custody, see
Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, and Scott, supra note 94; infra note 211. Additionally,
to the extent that joint custody and a co-equal relationship benefit children, the
presumption in favor of previously existing patterns of care encourages co-parenting
throughout a child's life. See infra part VI. And, for aeons feminists have pointed out the
drawbacks of women bearing primary responsibility for childcare. See, eg., Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 653 (1992).
196. See, eg., infra note 231 and accompanying text.
197. In the case of an initial order upon dissolution, nothing about the presumption
favoring previously established patterns of care suggests that the child should be denied
reasonable, even liberal, visitation with the nonprimary caretaking parent. Although the
idea behind the presumption is to maintain continuity and stability in the child's routine,
a visitation plan can be fashioned to emulate those routines where feasible and may even
ensure that the child has more consistent contact with the nonprimary caretaker. To be
sure, the nonprimary caretaker will become exclusively responsible for the child during the
time the child is in his or her care.
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dissolution or after a de facto arrangement, a presumption in favor of
previously existing child-care patterns values the stability, continuity,
and routine in the child's life.198
A. The Presumption Preserves Continuity and Stability
in the Child's Life
Many factors must change due to the very nature of the disso-
lution itself Changes may include the following: (1) One parent will
move out of the home; (2) the parties and joint income will be
divided to support two households, possibly requiring one of the
parties to begin working, or one or both parties to begin working
longer hours; 99 (3) parents will no longer split the tasks that they
had previously divided between themselves; and (4) each parent will
now bear 100% of the responsibility for child care while the child is
in that parent's physical custody.
Similarly, in the context of a modification proceeding, changes
will occur throughout the child's life and a number of events may
constitute such a change. Those changes or events may include the
following: (1) Either parent may remarry2 or have another child;
(2) either parent may begin working outside the home, change jobs,
start working fewer or increased hours, or attend school;" 1 (3)
either parent may become ill; (4) the child will grow older; and (5) the
child may develop special educational or medical needs. Perfect
198. "'[I]t is desirable that there be an end of litigation and undesirable to change the
child's established mode of living."' Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730-31,598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 385 (emphasis added) (quoting Connolly v. Connolly, 214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436,
29 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1963)).
199. Of course, if the primary caretaker had not previously worked outside the home
or must now work full time, the physical hours spent with the children will be decreased.
This is a change. But it is illogical to assume that changing fundamental roles even further
would be better. See discussion supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. Moreover,
using employment as a factor will in practice discriminate against women. Burchard v.
Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 540 n.10, 724 P.2d 486, 492 n.10, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 n.10 (1986);
see supra part IV.E; infra part V.C.
200. It is irrelevant with regard to the continuity and maintenance of the child's
relationship and bonds with the primary caretaking or custodial parent, and would result
in a discriminatory effect on women, to consider as a factor in a custody dispute whether
the nonprimary custodial parent remarries or can provide an in-home mother substitute
when the primary caretaking parent works outside the home. See infra part V.D.
Moreover, such a consideration is misleading. It does not emphasize the nonprimary
caretaking parent's role or relationship with the child, since a change in custody would be
based upon a third party's ability to provide care-not the parent's. See infra notes 242-46
and accompanying text.
201. See infra part V.C.
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replication of the previously existing pattern of child care would be
impossible. However, a custody award that patterns, as closely as
possible, parents' past involvement with the child is to be desired over
the indeterminate and speculative standards upon which the current
child custody laws rely.
Given that the child in a postdissolution environment will be
subject to numerous changes and that thereafter a child will continue
to undergo a myriad of changes throughout its life-including a
probable decrease in the quantity of time spent with the primary
caretaker -- common sense dictates that patterning custody as
closely as possible to previous modes of child care attempts to
maintain as much regularity and routine as possible in the child's life.
According to the California Supreme Court, "[s]tability, continuity,
and a loving relationship are the most important criteria for determin-
ing the best interests of the child. Implicit in this premise is the
recognition that existing emotional bonds between parent and child are
the first consideration in any best-interests determination."2 3 The
proper emphasis must be on the qualitative relationship that has
developed between the primary caretaking or custodial parent and the
child-not on the breakdown in hours each parent can spend with the
child later on' The California Supreme Court placed paramount
202. The decrease in the quantity of time the primary caretaker spends with the child
is an event that will occur naturally over time as well. For instance, the child will
eventually go to kindergarten in the mornings or afternoons. Thereafter, school hours
usually increase in relation to grade level. Thus, the child's needs will undergo a constant
metamorphosis throughout its life. Considering the amount of time the parent who had
been previously responsible for primary caretaking or custody of the child will be able to
spend in the future disregards, among other things, the emotional bonds established in
favor of other indeterminate, discretionary factors. See infra notes 204, 231 and
accompanying text; infra note 218 and accompanying text.
203. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 542, 724 P.2d at 494, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
204. Practically speaking, a standard that allows courts to consider the quantity of time
the primary caretaking or custodial parent can spend with the child absent neglect leads
parties to engage in absurd inquiries, parental spying, and further disruption of children's
lives. For example, Jeff Jones appeared on The Oprah Winfrey Show claiming that his ex-
wife Eleanore Meals put her career before their children. Oprah Transcript, supra note
6, at 5. Jeff was seeking a change in custody although Eleanore had primary responsibility
during their marriage and primary custody of their two daughters for the four years since.
Id. at 5-7. Although Jeff acknowledged that the children were well adjusted and doing fine
under the present arrangement, he wanted custody because Eleanore worked later than
he and because his new stay-at-home wife could care for their children. Id. at 6-7. Jeff
admitted that he got home from work most nights around 5:15 p.m. Id. at 8. Eleanore
said that she got home most nights by 6:00 p.m. Id. When asked "Why are you fighting
over an hour?," Jeff replied, "She-she-she can tell you that she gets home at 6:00. She
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importance on the emotional relationship between a parent and
child. 5 a relationship which the court acknowledged would be
devalued and used discriminatorily if a parent's work status were
treated as a detriment to that relationship.' Moreover, a further
restructuring of family roles ordered upon a dissolution or a change
in circumstances might well increase the instability in the child's life
over and above the disruption already brought on by the dissolution
or changed circumstances themselves.
Finally, allowing a judge to weigh among the various options he
or she thinks are the important factors in terms of the care and
custody of a child presumes that by simply deciding that it ought to
be so, a court could in reality successfully alter previously entrenched
family patterns.' Moreover, by not looking to previously estab-
lished, internally defined patterns of child care for guidance, current
child custody laws do not address "the costly task of future monitor-
ing and enforcement necessary if the parties do not readily adjust to
their externally defined roles.,
2 8
can say it here and there's no way to verify it otherwise unless you've been-you've been
tracking it like I have... ." ILd. at 21 (emphasis added). Thus, allowing time inquiries to
become a factor in a balance between two fit parents can lead to such behavior as the
nonprimary caretaking parent documenting the other's schedule, the constant possibility
of disruption, and the primary caretaking parent being forced to base career decisions on
what the person keeping tabs might think and do.
Pure time considerations are not distinguished in the following factors enumerated
in Garska as comprising, at least in part, primary parenting:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3)
purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and
trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school,
i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings;
(6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to
bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the
morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9)
educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills,
i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). The Burchard and Carney courts
placed particular emphasis on the importance of the existing emotional bonds between the
parent and child. See Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 541, 724 P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-
07; In re Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 739, 598 P.2d 36, 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1979).
205. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 541,724 P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.07; Carney, 24
Cal. 3d at 739, 598 P.2d at 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
206. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 539-41 & n.10, 724 P.2d at 492-93 & n.10, 229 Cal. Rptr.
at 805-07 & n.10; see supra part IV.E.; infra part V.C.
207. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
208. Scott, supra note 94, at 670.
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B. The Presumption Favors Parents' True
Choices-Not Judges' Opinions
Absent the parents' present ability to agree" to new or differ-
ent arrangements concerning the custody and care of their chil-
dren-either in a dissolution or modification context-the presump-
tion favoring previously established child-care patterns is more likely
to reflect both parents' true choices, as manifested by their past
behaviors regarding child care and lifestyle choices.2 10 In other
words the presumption looks to what each parent in fact did with
regard to child care, rather than what each parent now says that he
or she will do in the future. While this is not to say that the parents'
child-care choices during marriage were necessarily the "best, 21'
society has never reached a consensus on what are the best methods
of child care. The presumption in favor of established child-care
patterns properly leaves those individual choices to parents by
attempting to replicate their choices at the time they were making
them jointly. Parents in intact families have broad decision-making
leeway regarding their children.212 This presumption is the closest
way to preserve individual parents' constitutionally recognized right
to control their children in separated families.
209. If the parties are able to agree, as they do in 90% of the cases, Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 112, at 951 & n.3, there is no need for the presumption.
Moreover, in the 90% of the cases where settlement as to custody is reached, the
bargaining process would result in fairer outcomes for the primary caretaker and child
under the more determinate presumption recommended here. See discussion supra part
IV.D.
210. "[P]rivate ordering by divorcing couples is preferable to judicial ordering .... .
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
211. Dr. Margolin stated that a primary caretaker presumption is a bizarre notion
because it presumes that it is in the best interests of the child to have one parent.
Margolin Interview, supra note 98. In the context where both parents can agree and
cooperate in a joint-custody effort, this point has oodles of merit. On a common-sense
level as well as from an emotional perspective, it is difficult, if not impossible, to argue that
a relationship allowing a child as much contact as possible with both parents is not best.
Moreover, scholarship supporting that point abounds. See, e.g., Singer & Reynolds, supra
notes 89, 181. However, scholarship also abounds with regard to how a joint physical
custody award is rarely workable when parents cannot reach agreements on child rearing,
in high conflict situations, or when there are imbalances of power or financial inequities.
See, e.g., The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and
Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 200-01 (1995); Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89.
212. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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In the modification proceeding context, however, it may be fair
to say that preexisting court-ordered arrangements, if not ordered by
the court based upon previously existing child-care patterns, do not
necessarily preserve parents' child-care choices. However, child-care
patterns will have been established nonetheless by the time the
modification is sought. It is also important to realize that the desire
to change the custody plan usually occurs when one parent wants the
change and the other simply desires to maintain the status quo.
Moreover, it is also interesting to note that the majority of cases
settle"' and that, also in the majority of cases, mothers have prima-
ry custody of their children.214 Furthermore, in a study of 1000 Cali-
fornia families in which joint custody was ordered, approximately
seventy-five percent of parents had joint legal custody, while
approximately nineteen percent had joint physical custody.
215
According to Professor Elizabeth S. Scott, these statistics "suggest that
parents resist radically altering patterns of care and authority estab-
lished in the intact family. 216  Additionally, the California study
revealed a significant "drift" toward de facto mother custody in cases
where the father was awarded primary physical custody217 and in
joint physical custody cases 18 These figures suggest that even when
the preexisting court order was entered, the child-care patterns were
based on, or tended to work their way back to, the primary caretaker
having physical custody of the children.1 9
213. See supra note 209.
214. See supra note 10.
215. Scott, supra note 94, at 635 n.66; see also Polikoff, supra note 10, at 183 ("Under
mandatory joint custody provisions, mothers usually continue to do primary or almost sole
parenting, with less control over their children and their own lives, and less child
support."); ihL at 183 n.64 ("One Los Angeles trial court judge suggested that 95% of all
joint custody awards involved joint legal but not joint physical custody."). "Although joint
childrearing by mothers and fathers should be encouraged, joint presumptions are not
carefully tailored to do this." Id. at 183.
216. Scott, supra note 94, at 635.
217. Id. at 635 n.67. A drift of nearly 23% was found in these cases. Id.
218. IL A drift of nearly 40% was found in these cases. Id. Moreover, Scott argues
that "[b]ecause the drift is systematically in the direction of mother custody, it probably
cannot be explained simply as resulting from a difficulty in maintaining joint custody
arrangements." I& at 635 n.68.
219. Stacy Phillips said that when she is advising a primary caretaking parent with
regard to a potential custody battle in the general case-naturally her advice is fine-tuned
to the individual case-she sometimes has the following suggestion: Rather than engage
with the nonprimary caretaker in a costly and emotionally destructive fight, thereby
harming the children at issue, it might be better to let the nonprimary caretaking parent
begin to have a more active role vis-a-vis a joint arrangement. Phillips Interview, supra
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Arguably, if we are really trying to give parents what they want,
should we not pay heed to the preferences they state at the initiation
of the custody suit or modification proceeding? It could be said that
"[p]arents are directly expressing their preferences when they pursue
their custody claims [and] this would seem to be a more accurate
measure of the value they place on custody than are inferential claims
about 'real' preferences."'  However, according to Professor Scott,
the fact that the parents are each seeking custody "might tell.., less
about [their] preference[s] or [their] probable performance[s] as...
caretaker[s] than does [their] past relationship with the child. 22'
Potential motivations for the nonprimary caretaker to seek custody
may include the following: (1) strategic reasons such as affecting
economic bargainingm or effecting economic gain through a shift in
the support obligation;' (2) spiteful reasons borne from the emo-
tional context in which the custody proceeding transpires; (3) simply
wanting proportionately more time than previously enjoyed with the
child; and (4) valuing the idea of "custody" more than the remaining
alternative of "visitation."' 4 In short Professor Scott maintains that
"[m]ore important than the desires parents verbalize ... are the
deeper preferences revealed by their behavior before divorce and
their adaptation afterwards."'  Thus, a presumption favoring pre-
viously established patterns of child care provides the "best available
note 188. According to Ms. Phillips one of two things would then occur. Id The first is
that the child would begin to benefit by the increased role of the nonprimary caretaker,
giving the child two active parents where there once had been one. Id The second
possibility is that the nonprimary caretaker would eventually gravitate back to his or her
previous role of lesser involvement, and the primary caretaker would have custody-but
without the fight. ld.; see Scott, supra note 94, at 635 & nn.66-68 (suggesting that drift
toward de facto mother custody is common after joint award or sole award to father). For
this to be effective, it assumes that the parents could reach a level of cooperation. While
it would not preserve the continuity and stability of the previously existing patterns of
child care, that idea provides a solution absent the two parents' ability to agree. In the
case suggested by Ms. Phillips, both parents would necessarily agree-and parents in
agreement as to how best to share their children in a postdissolution context could only
constitute the best of all worlds for everyone involved.
220. Scott, supra note 94, at 636.
221. Id.
222. See supra part IV.D.
223. See supra note 126.
224. Scott, supra note 94, at 636 & n.70.
225. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
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guide for predicting... which arrangement will be most stable ....
[a]nd also in the best interests of the child." '
C. Parental Employment is Not a Relevant Consideration Under
the Presumption Favoring Previously Established
Child-Care Patterns
Under the presumption favoring previously established child-care
patterns, parental employment is an irrelevant consideration.227
While newly obtained or increased employment creates a "change" in
the quantity of hours the primary caretaker or custodial parent can
spend physically caring for the child, basing a custody determination
on such a change is inappropriate. It assumes that the bonds between
226. Id.
[Factors about which conclusions can be made for the future [are] most
intelligently [based] upon a course of conduct in the past. At least with regard
to the primary caretaker parent there is a track record to which a court can look
and where that parent is fit he or she should be awarded continued custody.
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 364.
227. See Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531,540,724 P.2d 486, 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800,
806 (1986); Polikoff, supra note 10, at 183.
The usefulness in dual-career marriages of a presumption that favors previously
existing patterns of care, like the primary caretaker presumption, has been questioned.
See, e.g., Elster, supra note 108, at 37-38. However, such questioning ignores that "[i]n
most families... including those in which both parents are employed, mothers function
as primary and fathers as secondary caregivers." Scott, supra note 94, at 661-62; see also
supra note 229 (citing numerous authorities stating that research indicates that working
mothers perform primary caretaking of children more so than fathers). It also ignores
many of the day-to-day decision making, planning, scheduling, and guidance functions that
courts favoring presumptions in favor of primary caretaking or continuity and stability
examine. See supra note 190.
Cases where parental employment results in actual neglect or harm to the child are
distinguished and beyond the scope of this Comment. See supra part V.A. While, again,
one could argue until the cows come home about what number of working hours or types
of schedules do result in actual neglect, the California Supreme Court has clearly stated
that a primary caretaker's employment and educational pursuits-even in light of the
nonprimary caretaker's ability to provide an in-home mother substitute-do not constitute
neglect. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
And even if the primary caretaking or custodial parent's employment were
considered, which this Comment argues is improper, the proper initial inquiry would be
"How are the kids doing under the current arrangement?" See supra note 98; see also
Witmayer v. Witmayer, 467 A.2d 371 (Pa. 1983) (holding that evidence that primary
caretaker who worked was also occasionally absent from home in evenings without
evidence of deleterious effect on child does not support reason to change custody); Oprah
Transcript, supra note 6, at 22 ("I'm just trying to understand, if the kids are really doing
OK, then what is the point? .... What is the issue here?" (quoting Oprah Winfrey)); id.
at 23 ("If it ain't broke, why fix it[?]" (quoting Lynne Gold-Bikin, Chair of the Family Law
Section, American Bar Association)).
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the primary caretaking parent and child are fungible with the bonds
the child has developed with the other parent. Such a determination
devalues the emotional attachments developed and places primary
importance on the quantity of time spent with the child. It also
ignores the fact that the nonprimary caretaker participated with less
quantity in the first place. Using the primary caretaker's new
employment status as a factor warranting a modification in custody or
caretaking arrangements assumes that change on top of change would
be desirable.' Moreover, it overlooks the statistics that most
mothers work outside the home and that "[t]ypically, it is the mother
who provides most day-to-day care, whether or not she works outside
the home." 9  Finally, it uniquely discriminates against primary
caretaking or custodial parents who must return to work-by
essentially treating their employment as a change or negative factor
and ignoring or regarding favorably the employment status of the
nonprimary caretaker. The California Supreme Court stated:
A custody determination must be based upon a true assess-
ment of the emotional bonds between parent and child ....
It must reflect also a factual determination of how best to
provide continuity of attention, nurturing and care. It
cannot be based upon an assumption, unsupported by
scientific evidence, that a working mother cannot provide
such care-an assumption particularly unfair when ... the
mother has in fact been the primary caregiver."'
228. See supra part V.A.
229. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 543, 742 P.2d at 494, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing
scholarship on this subject); Polikoff, supra note 10, at 183; Scott, supra note 94, at 661-62;
Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 70, at 461 n.28 ("Empirical research indicates that working
mothers continue to perform most child care responsibilities and spend far more time with
their children than do fathers."); Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 522 (stating that in
reality women in most families still bear primary responsibility for child care--even in two-
career families); see supra note 227.
230. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
231. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540,724 P.2d at 492,229 Cal. Rptr. at 806. The reasoning
in Burchard relied in great part upon the California Supreme Court's prior ruling in In re
Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725,739,598 P.2d 36,44,157 Cal. Rptr. 383,391 (1979). In Carney the
court considered what was at the "heart of the parent-child relationship." Id
Contemporary psychology confirms what wise families have perhaps always
known-that the essence of parenting is not to be found in the harried rounds
of daily carpooling endemic to modern suburban life, or even in the doggedly
dutiful acts of "togetherness" committed every weekend by well-meaning fathers
and mothers across America. Rather, its essence lies in the ethical, emotional,
and intellectual guidance that the parent gives to the child throughout his
formative years, and often beyond. The source of this guidance is the adult's
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The court went on to say that "[alny actual deficiency in care,
whether due to the parent's work or other cause, would of course be
a proper consideration in deciding custody."' Although the court
did not articulate what would constitute an "actual deficiency," it
clearly and definitively stated what would not be considered a
deficiency. The fact that a primary caretaking or custodial parent,
"because of work and study, must entrust the child to daycare centers
and babysitters .... is not a suitable basis for [changing custody
orders]." 3 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird wrote
separately to underscore that [it is] an abuse of discretion,
... [to] assum[e] that there is a negative relation between a
woman's ... need or desire to work and the quality of her
parenting .... [O]utmoded notions such as these result in
harsh judgments which unfairly penalize working mothers.
When it is no longer the norm for children to have a mother
home all day, courts cannot indulge the notion that a
working parent is ipso facto a less satisfactory parent. Such
reasoning distracts attention from the real issues in a custody
dispute and leads to arbitrary results.
Moreover, there is no accepted body of expert opinion
that maternal employment per se has a detrimental effect on
a child.... Public policy needs to move in the direction of
more flexible work arrangements for mothers, towards
enhancing the quality of the environment for children,
towards enhancing the personal satisfaction of careers for
women, and towards promoting the view that maternal
employment has no negative influence on children's develop-
ment.234
own experience of life; its motive power is parental love and concern for the
child's well-being; and its teachings deal with such fundamental matters as the
child's feelings about himself, his relationships with others, his system of values,
his standards of conduct, and his goals and priorities in life.
Id In other words the proper inquiry regarding each parent's child-care contribution is
not necessarily quantitative, but rather qualitative in nature. See ida; see also supra note
204 (arguing from practical standpoint that quantitative inquiries may even be disruptive).
232. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
233. Id
234. Id at 541, 724 P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 807 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
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Moreover, the majority also stated that "any presupposition that
single working parents provide inferior care to their child [would] in
practice discriminate against women."'
D. Considering the Nonprimary Caretaker's Ability to Provide a
Stepparent or Other In-Home Mother Substitute
Is Irrelevant to the Child's Need for
Continuity and Discriminates Against Women
Factoring in-home mother substitutes into a custody decision
devalues the emotional bonds between the child and primary
caretaking or custodial parent and places a higher value on the
traditional notion of having a woman-any woman-in the home to
care for the child.
[T]he ... assumption that such care [by a second wife or a
relative of the father] is the equivalent of that which a
nonworking mother would provide "comes dangerously close
to implying that mothers are fungible-that one woman will
do just as well as another in rearing any particular chil-
dren."3
6
The California Supreme Court found that the fact that a father's
new wife would be home to provide constant care for the child, rather
than relying on babysitters and day care as the mother'would have to
do, was insignificant compared to the fact that the mother had been
the primary caretaker of the child. The court stated that reason-
ing that a working, studying mother who relies on "day care centers
and babysittersf is per se inferior to care by a father who also works,
but can leave the child with a stepmother at home[,] [is] reasoning...
not suitable [as a] basis for a custody order."38
Considering a nonparent's role would belie any goal of increasing
the nonprimary caretaking parent's role or relationship with the child,
since a change in custody would be based upon the nonparent's ability
to provide care-not the parent's. Thus, considering a stepparent or
other in-home mother substitute would be an irrelevant and mislead-
235. 1& at 540 n.10, 724 P.2d at 492 n.10, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 805 n.10.
236. Id. at 546,724 P.2d at 496,229 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (quoting Nancy D. Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria
Used in Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 235,241 (1982)).
237. I& at 540, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
238. Id.
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ing factor when addressing the child's need for continuity. Addition-
ally, it would discriminate against women.
The double standard appears again when.., the father
is permitted to rely on the care which someone else will give
to the child. It is not uncommon for courts to award custody
to a father when care will actually be provided by a relative,
second wife, or even a babysitter" 9
Moreover, "[d]ivorced men are more likely to remarry than divorced
women, and far more likely to marry a nonworking spouse."2' And
even if the mother could find a nonworking spouse to stay home with
the kids, she is less likely to be able to support one.241 When a
decision to remove a child from the working primary caretaking or
custodial parent is based upon the ability of a stepparent to care for
the child, the reasoning for that decision flies in the face of the
parental preference doctrine 42 and its underlying policy.243
239. Id at 545-46,724 P.2d at 496,229 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Recall
that in Jennifer Ireland's situation, the change in custody was based upon the fact that the
paternal grandmother would be home with the child. See supra part II. In Eileen
Adams's case, custody was transferred from the primary caretaking and custodial mother
to the father based upon his new wife's ability to be home with the child. See supra part
II; see also supra note 204 (discussing situation in which father wants custody of children
whom he admits are happy and adjusted in their current situation with their working
mother because his new wife is home to care for them).
240. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540 n.10, 724 P.2d at 492 n.10, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806 n.10;
see also Polikoff, supra note 10, at 182 ("[Because] divorced men remarry twice as often
as divorced women, the consideration of remarriage can actually have a devastating effect
on women in custody proceedings." (footnote omitted)).
241. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1994) (ordering preference of child
custody to parents first); see also Linda D. Elrod, A Review of the Year in Family Law, 28
FAM. L.Q. 541, 555 (1995) (stating that parental preference doctrine requiring child to be
placed with parent unless parent is unfit remains in effect); Brooke Ashlee Gershon,
Comment, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: Adoption of Kelsey S. Raises the
Rights of Unwed Fathers Above the Best Interests of the Child, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 741,
746 (1995) (stating that "fin determining best interests, each jurisdiction applies a 'parental
presumption'-that the placement of a child with his or her biological parents is generally
in the best interests of that child").
243. The preference for giving biological parents control of their children arose from
the reasoning that "[e]mpowering parents [with control of their children absent unfitness]
represents a means of ensuring that [child-rearing] decisions will be made by someone who
presumably will act in the children's best interests." Martin Guggenheim, The Best
Interests of the Chili: Much Ado about Nothing?, in CHILD, PARENT, & STATE 27,28 (S.
Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994).
Guggenheim stated that "[jiudging parents when they have not fallen below minimal
standards of parenting is just not worth the time, effort, and uncertainty." Id. at 29. That
same reasoning, this Comment argues, should be applied when one parent seeks to modify
CHILDLESS MOTHERS?
VI. CONCLUSION
Laws that establish a degree of certainty in the outcome of
custody disputes will go a long way toward ensuring less litigation,
fairer negotiations and settlements, and the finality of custody
decisions. The knowledge that custody awards would be based upon
each parent's past participation with child care renders the
noncaretaker unable to brandish a potential custody dispute as a
bargaining chip. Further, laws that perpetuate the parents' chosen
child-rearing practices during marriage-not what a court thinks is
best after the fact-extend to postdissolution cases the constitutionally
backed reluctance in this country to intervene in the parent-child
relationship except in cases of abuse or neglect.
A presumption favoring previously existing child-care patterns,
like the primary caretaker presumption, would be a gender-neutral
standard "placing paramount value on preserving the child's relation-
ship with the parent who has provided primary nurturance and
care."'  While at this point in time such a presumption may
actually result in maternal custody, "it would do so not because of
sex-stereotyped notions about a mother's love, but because the child's
needs for nurturance and continuity are still legitimate needs."' 45
"A father filling that role would, of course, also be entitled to the
presumption." 6
A presumption favoring previously existing child-care patterns
will encourage coparenting from the beginning of a child's life because
parents will know that custody orders will reflect their past participa-
tion in child care. In the postdissolution context, then, the presump-
tion will ensure that the parents' respective roles relating to the
children's care are inspired rather than ordered. If it is best for the
child to have two parents, then logic dictates that it would be best for
the child to have both parents throughout its life. If there was co-
equal caretaking during marriage, the presumption ensures that the
custody determination will mirror that image. Standards favoring
joint custody regardless of who had provided care previously actually
discourage coparenting by sending a clear message to the
noncaretaker that the possibility of obtaining a "windfall" right to
status quo child-care arrangements in the postdissolution context.
244. Polikoff, supra note 10, at 177-78.
245. IL at 178 (footnote omitted).
246. Ic.
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custody of the children exists whenever he or she brings a proceeding
for dissolution or modification.
Parents who truly are concerned by the thought of losing custody
of their children under such a presumption can address those concerns
not by going to court, but by changing "where childcare begins-in
the home."'247 When men and women truly act in the best interests
of their children before and after divorce-as co-parents-the pre-
sumption will become a thing of the past.2'
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248. See Singer & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 523.
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